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Political connection is a prevalent global phenomenon. Its effect on 
micro-economy and enterprises are more pronounced in developing countries, where 
law protection is underdeveloped. Research in political connection has attracted a lot 
of attention in industry and academia recently. Previous research finds that political 
connection affects financing, investment efficiency, tax benefit, market competition 
and so on. This object of this paper is to examine the consequences of political 
connection on manager turnover and earnings management around turnover.  
As a less developed capital market where the manager market is not efficient and 
the governance intervenes a lot, it is possible that political connection plays a more 
important role in manager turnover, hence influences the behavior of managers around 
turnover. Therefore, analyzing manager turnover and earnings management from 
political perspective will help us understand how to establish an efficient mechanism 
to enhance corporate governance efficiency.  
This paper uses a sample of listed not-SEO firms between 2004 and 2008 to 
examine the relation between political connection, manager turnover and earnings 
management. Firstly, we proves statistical summary of the sample, including the 
frequency and proportion of firms experience manager turnover, the reasons of 
turnover, the sources of succeeding managers and the education background of 
managers. Then, based on agency theory, rent seeking theory and limited rationality 
theory, we discuss the relation among earnings management, political connection and 
manager behavior. In the following chapter we show the empirical results. Finally, we 
conclude the main arguments and results, caution the shortcomings of our research 
and identify potential further research areas.  
The main results of this research: political connections influence manager 
turnover sensitivity on earnings but the influences vary among different kinds of 
connections; “Members of PC and CPPCC” Connections are negatively related with 
forced turnover possibility while “Government Officials” Connections are positively 
related with force turnover possibility. We do not find evidences supporting the 
assumption that managers manage earnings before forced turnover. Besides, the 
political connections of leaving mangers have no effect on their earnings management 
behavior.  
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